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Lacan and the Subject of Law: Sexuation and
Discourse in the Mapping of Subject
Positions That Give the Ur-Form of Law
Ellie Ragland*
In 1972 and 1973, Jacques Lacan gave the Seminar he entitled Encore.'
In Chapter 7 of Encore, "A Love Letter," 2 he offered an interpretation of
Freud's Totem and Taboo3 that is essentially an original theory of the foun-
dation of law. By reinterpreting Freud's development of the Oedipus myth
as the founding myth that explains the derivation of law, Lacan offers a
structural logic to explain his theory in light of Freud's fable of the primal
hoard in Totem and Taboo. Working since the 1950s to understand the
differences between metaphor and metonymy, Lacan reconceptualized the
Oedipus complex as a paternal metaphor derived from the subject's experi-
ences of castration and the phallus.4 By arguing that metaphor functions by
predictable laws and that myth has structure as well, Lacan demonstrated in
Seminar XX that myth has an ordering that guarantees a certain predictabil-
ity. Myth, says Lacan, gives epic form to that which works from structure.
He defines this structure in Seminar XX as the Borromean triadic unit of the
real, symbolic, and imaginary.' A fourth order, the order of the Symptom or
* Class of 1962 Alumni Professor of Romance Languages (French) and Comparative
Literatures (English). B.A., Michigan State University, 1963; M.A., University of Michigan,
1967; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1972. This Article is based on an address presented
at the Washington and Lee School of Law on March 28, 1997, in connection with the Lacan
and the Subject of Law Symposium.
1. JACQUES LACAN, LE S9MINAIRE DE JACQUES LACAN, LIVRE XX: ENCORE, 1972-
1973 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1975).
2. See id. at 73; Jacques Lacan, A Love Letter, in FEMININE SExUALITY: JACQUES
LACAN AND THE icoLEFREODmvNE 149 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline
Rose trans., 1982) (English translation).
3. 13 SIGMUND FREUD, Totem and Taboo, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COM-
PLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1 (James Strachey et al. eds. & trans.,
1955) [hereinafter THE STANDARD EDITION].
4. See JACQUES LACAN, On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of
psychosis, in ]arlrs: A SELECTION 179, 199-200 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Alan Sheridan
trans., 1977) (1966).
5. See LACAN, supra note 1, at 14.
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sinthome, knots the other three units of associational meaning into a necklace
of mind/memory made of thousands and thousands of such connexions.6
This Article will seek to establish that cultural law has the same roots
as individual desire. This paradox lies at the heart of the minimal requisites
necessary to maintain the "social link" Lacan recognized as present when
language is used to negotiate a lack-in-being. Therefore, for Lacan, "dis-
course" is not commensurate with conversation, communication, speech, or
intersubjective language exchanges. Rather, discourse makes a social link
insofar as the agent of speech addresses the other from a place of lack.
Lacan did not envision the other as other person, but as representative of
something. Thus, the other occupies a place in language that Lacan defined
as having quantifiable dimensions at the level of meaning something for
someone.
In the master discourse, the one seeking confirmation of his or her
knowledge (S1) addresses the other as the-one-who-knows, the supposed
subject of knowledge (S). The simple supposition that the other's knowledge
confirms or guarantees your being is not necessarily commensurable with the
grammatical usage of "I" and "you." It is, rather, the castration or lack-in-
being of the subject of desire that Lacan stressed. In the academic discourse,
the professor addresses the cause of the student's desire (a), seeking to
transmit knowledge by evoking interest. The hysteric speaks to the other,
not so much as a guarantee of his or her own knowledge, but as an embodi-
ment of law or authority (SI). Finally, in her discourse, the analyst ad-
dresses the analysand's lack of knowledge about his or her desire ($) in
reference to his or her identity as symbolized by a few master signifiers
(S,).
7
Lacan's other theories implicitly propose that one must symbolize a
minimal number of places - eight, to be precise - in order to make "a
social link." This assertion makes sense if one accepts linguist and logician
Charles Pyle's premise that: (1) most individuals in a group have symbolized
mother, father, self, and a fourth position that Lacan called dummy at bridge;
and (2) the psychotic subject has not symbolized the position of the father.
At the simplest level, one could define the dummy position as the awareness
6. See Jacques Lacan, Le sinthome, Siminaire du 18 Novembre 1975, in JOYCE AVEC
LACAN 36, 37-48 (1987).
7. See LACAN, supra note 1, at 21. In Chapter 2 entitled "A Jakobson," Lacan
indicates:
the agent the other
the truth the production
Id. The terms are: S,, the master signifier; S2, knowledge; S, the subject; and a, the excess
or surplus value injouissance. See id.; Jacques Lacan, On Jakobson, reprinted in 1 GaADIvA
152, 152-60 (Louise Vasvari Fainberg trans., 1977).
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that at the place of the other, one symbolizes something other than the
common terms of one's own narcissistic identifications with the first figures
of one's base family unit; it is also a question of to what one's desire is
referred!
Long before he formalized his discourse theory in Seminar XX, Lacan
had schematized the individual speaking subject in Seminar II by using the
Schema L, a quadrature of four places. In Schema L, Lacan argued that the
speaking subject is stretched over these four places rather than being a unity
or unitary self.9 He named those places: (1) the Other, which means both
the world of language and images an infant is born into, as well as the world
outside the infant's own biological organism;' ° (2) the Ideal ego, an uncon-
scious formation made up of identifications with others who give the Ur-
model or form of the traits that individuals later seek in ego ideals in an
8. Charles Pyle, Lacan's Theory of Language, in PROVING LACAN: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE FORCE OF EVIDENTIARY KNOWLEDGE (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 71, on file
with author).
9. See JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK I: THE EGO IN
FREUD'S THEORY AND IN THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, 1954-1955, at 243 (Jacques-
Alain Miller ed., Sylvana Tomaselli trans., 1988). Lacan structured the Schema L as:
(Es) S ............ ()' other
~ %
(ego) () ) Other
Id.; cf. 18 SIGMUND FREUD, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in THE STANDARD EDITION,
supra note 3, at 7; ELLE RAGLAND-SULLIVAN, JACQUES LACAN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 313 n.4 (1986).
10. Lacan emphasized the uniqueness of each subject's particular signifying associations
taken from the Other - birth into the Other - in his development of a fourth order of the
knot. Cf. RosNE LEFORT & ROBERT LEFORT, BIRTH OF THE OTHER 7, 265-77 (Marc du Ry
et al. eds., 1994). Lacan presents the knot as a dimension in language which has the meta-
phorical structure of a symptom insofar as the structurations of desire - normative, neurotic,
perverse, psychotic - are signifieds that refer to the constructing (or not) of the Father's
Name as a signifier for the first experiences that constitute the law for a subject (which Freud
attributed to an impersonal superego agency). That is, the metaphorical substitution of father
for mother creates the experience of difference as an abstraction which Lacan called the
phallic signifier. Thephallic signifier is not only the base form of the law. It also underlies
the possibility of a person's making discriminatory judgments or thinking dialectically.
In its French medieval spelling as sinthome, the knot has the metonymic structure of the
repressed desire of each subject.
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effort to repeat the first experiences of images, words and drive affects;
(3) ego ideals, or the place of the other, where intra-subjectivity first enters
human relations as a contradictory relation that points from one to another
within an individual's own language; (4) the speaking subject (Es/SIS) which
is formed both retroactively in time and inversely in space from the Other
on the symbolic axis; and (5) the Ideal ego on the imaginary axis. The
speaking subject does not acquire speech directly from grammatical language
or from others in the container/contained imaginary model of learning ad-
vanced by contemporary learning theories. Rather, he or she only perceives
or thinks at all through a continually dynamic process wherein socio-conven-
tional language is transformed in the experience of identification with others.
This process follows the laws of the language functions of metonymy and
metaphor. Lacan placed the cause of desire in metonymy, while metaphor
uses substitutions of sound for sound, word for word, image for word, object
for object, and so on, to make meaning.
There is, then, no direct one-to-one, robot-like repetitive learning of the
words of the world as linguist Benjamin Whorf once suggested." Nor is this
learning reducible to silent inner speech as Lev S. Vygostky maintained. 2
An understanding of Lacan's theory of language also obviates much feminist
misunderstanding of his work, as typified by arguments such as those ad-
vanced by philosopher Nancy Fraser. Fraser designates Lacan's thought as
"Lacanianism," and she mistakenly writes that Lacan put forth a single
symbolic discourse agency or system that ignores both the social and the
pluralities of subjectivity.13
Although grammar expresses conventional language of the symbolic,
grammatical language is not commensurable with discourse in Lacanian
theory. Lacan's theory is quite different, then, from Foucault's conflation
of discourse with a given social language. But what does a theory of dis-
course, defined as something apart from grammatical language, have to do
with the foundations of law? Lacan proposed that his discourse unit consti-
tutes a skeletal structure to the social itself in any historical moment or place.
11. See John B. Carroll, Introduction to BENJAMiN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT,
AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 1, 27 (John B. Carroll ed.,
1956) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS]; BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Grammatical Categories,
in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra, at 87, 100; BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Language, Mind, and
Reality, in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra, at 246, 259.
12. See Lev Vygotsky, The Problem of the Cultural Development of the Child, in THE
VYGOTSKY READER 57, 67-69 (Ren6 van der Veer & Jaan'Valsiner eds., 1994); LEv VYGOT-
SKY, UNDERSTANDING VYGOTSKY: A QUEST FOR SYNTHESIS 266-71 (Ren6 van der Veer &
Jaan Valsiner eds., 1991).
13. See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
"POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 159-70 (1989).
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This invokes a (near) universal picture of knowledge as that which organizes
a few minimal necessities in myriad patterns. Lacan's argument develops by
reference to three basic human experiences around which individuals orga-
nize institutions: love, desire, and the incest taboo. Therefore, the terms of
a local universal symbolic language are only content-specific insofar as they
elaborate and develop these basic structures of being. Knowledge arises, at
first, in order to continually fill up a lack-in-being created by the psychic
separation of infant and mother with substitute "objects" of desire. Further,
because any encounter with the lack is unpleasant if not unbearable, identifi-
cations quickly solidify into fixations (that Lacan calledfixions, punning on
fictions) that produce a point of more than enjoyment, or a surplus value
within enjoyment or satisfaction.
The repetitions of self or identity that Lacan identified as a master
signifier (S) lie "beyond the pleasure principle" and place a limit point in
being and language that blocks individual and social change, making the
master signifier a rigid designator of narcissisticjouissance. By discovering
that psychotic language is a mental state of being inside language but outside
the law of the taboo, Lacan came to the understanding that language func-
tions differently from discourse. The psychotic is in language but not under
the law of the phallic signifier. Thus, the psychotic subject is oriented to-
wards language on the slope of metonymy rather than on the language slope
of substitutive metaphor. 4
Lacan's distinction here is an original contribution to our understanding
of how the mind/language works. In advancing his theory of how psychosis
functions in language, he goes beyond behavioral descriptions of the psycho-
ses and gets out of the impasses of theories which attribute the cause of
psychosis to brain dysfunction or loss of reality. By demonstrating that a
speaking subject can function by a certain rational logic within language and
within the social realm and, yet, have a different relationship to the lack-in-
being than do most subjects, he unveils a viable way of functioning in
language and within a social group that does not take the lack-in-being as
referent. If, then, one takes the lack-in-being as the basis of dialectical
thought, the capacity for such a manner of mind would not be, as it was for
Hegel, a dynamic movement of thesis/antithesis/sublation. Instead, from
Lacan's perspective, dialectical thinking would be an equivalent of a dy-
namic movement of thought in grammatical language. Individuals use
language, taken here to mean thought, for the concrete purpose of filling in
the lack-in-being that responds to the desires first constituted by an infant's
14. See JACQUES LACAN, LE StMINAIRE DE JACQUES LACAN, LVRE mH: LES PSY-
CHOSES, 1955-1956, at 233, 243 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1981). See generally JACQUES
LACAN, DE LA PSYCHOS PARANOYAQUE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LA PERSONNALIT (Seuil
1975) (1932).
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symbolization of its body. Thus, the body is imaginarily constructed in
reference to a dynamic of having and losing "objects" of satisfaction. Lacan
proposes, then, that the earliestforms of thought refer to the unary traits or
concrete details retained at the moment of the loss of the objects that caused
the first desires: The primordial shape of thought comes from corporal
identifications bound to a void.
Borrowing the concept of separation from symbolic logic to argue that
separation occurs at the same time as alienation,"5 Lacan asserts that an
infant's first experience of the law symbolizes the father's sexual interest in
the mother as an interdiction placed on the child's ownjouissance of oneness
with the mother. This means that the infant symbolizes (or not) as a first
form of law, the interference of the real father - in an image or figure of a
father - who shows his desire for the mother as an implicit "no" to a
symbiotic oneness in identification with her. Lacan argues that this experi-
ence of loss of identification is a castration by the Father's "no." It produces
as a referent a paradoxical third effect, the experience of castration that
arises as a structuration of desire in response to the phallic signifier, taken
as an injunction to difference (0).
Lacan's concept is of the phallic signifier as a third term effect that
arises from the mother/father/infant triad at the point where the infant is the
phallus in the couple (i.e., an object of desire for each parent). This quite
clearly does not intend that the "phallic" signifier means the representation
of the male sexual organ. Contrary to the imaginary phallus that is an
object-cause-of-desire and, as such, a non-dialectical object (a), a limit point
of the absolute, the phallic signifier points to a dialectical movement of
identification between the mother and father on the part of the infant. Thus,
the phallic signifier points to the effect of prohibition which gives rise to a
lack-in-being whose inverse is the subject of desire. The imposition of a
"no" to oneness with the mother places a bar of division upon the infant's
elemental thinking processes by dividing them into two kinds of knowledge:
(1) the narcissistic knowledge of the imaginary ego and (2) the knowledge
of desire that refers itself to the Father's Name. Therefore, the Lacanian
subject differs quite radically from the "self" of Foucauldian "self-fashion-
ing." The Lacanian subject is constituted primordially and within a negativ-
ity that gives the lie to the social myths of free will and freedom of choice
which individuals generally use to represent their experience to themselves.
Perhaps the freedoms of choice that remain open are all the more important
given that so much is determined as a limit concomitant with the ego in the
15. See generally Bruce Fink, Alienation and Separation: Logical Moments of Lacan's
Dialectic ofDesire, 4 NEWSL. FREUDIAN FIELD 78 (1990). Cf. JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 211-16 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan
Sheridan trans., 1978).
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laying down of primordial signifying networks from which the subject is
henceforth appended.
Long before the infant interprets the sexual difference in the Oedipal
tailoring of identity to sexuality and biological gender that Lacan called the
paternal metaphor, she has begun to structure the different types of meaning
of the world of signs within a logic of cuts.16 Insofar as forms and images
first captivate an infant, the first cut is between the image of an object and
the wrenching experience of losing that object. This experience of loss
might be described as the cut an infant experiences between the image or
sense of having a thing that fulfills through a seeming oneness of consis-
tency, and the rupture of that imaginary consistency which introduces divi-
sion and conflict into being. It gives rise to the second order of the real whose
residual traces or introjects Freud described as unary traits or Einzeger
Zigen. Peirce called these traits the mark. Such traits of identification with
an imaginary or real partial object - whether a breast, a gaze, a voice, a
phoneme, a urinary flow, a phallus, the feces, or a nothing - retain proper-
ties of the positive object, as well as affective reminiscences of the experi-
ence of loss. They enter thought as enigmas and impasses. We have words
like "separation anxiety," melancholy, normal mourning, depression, and
others to describe the negative encounters with loss that Lacan locates as a
void place in being that enters language as the "sense" of a meaning.
The cut or break with the imaginary traits that constitutes an ordering
of the real is a type of disjunction that Charles Pyle has described as having
the character of brute fact.17 This description is consonant with Lacan's
interpretation of Freud's theory of conflict as a category where the real of
contradiction operates logically in language. 8 Lacan placed the negative
experience of an encounter with the void in the areas of overlap between
imaginary form and the real experience of trauma or displeasure qua loss.
Loss of the semblances that seem to structure one's universe, albeit as
illusions or false facades, produces an encounter with the real of anxiety
itself (0).19 Although Lacan described the object of anxiety as the void, one
16. See 1 CHARLES SANDERS PEiRCE, On a New List of Categories, in COLLECTED
PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEiRCE 287, 292-93 (Charles Hartshome & Paul Weiss eds.,
1960) (1931); 1 CHARLES SANDERS PERCE, Three Principle Senses in which Comprehension
and Extension Will Be Taken in this Paper, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS
PEiRca 248, 252 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960) (1931).
17. See Charles Pyle, Natural Logic and the Law of Markedness § 2.2 (Sept. 25, 1989)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
18. See Ellie Ragland, An Overview of the Real, with Examples from Seminar , in
READING SEMINARS I AND II: LACAN'S RETURN TO FREuD 192, 194 (Richard Feldstein et al.
eds., 1996).
19. See Jacques Lacan, L'Angoisse, S6minaire du Januier 1963, at 125, 127 (Jan. 23,
1097
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091 (1997)
can also attribute a referent to anxiety. Freud made the concept of castration
anxiety famous and developed it at length in his "Little Hans Case,"20 in
which he argues that Hans's father is not enough of an interdicting force to
calm his own anxieties about his sexual difference from his mother.2"
By recasting Freud in Lacanian terms, one can assert that if the imagi-
nary father is not an adequate force of law, bringing about symbolic castra-
tion, then the real father functions as pure anxiety in the other/Other. In
Lacan's topological terms, a loss of imaginary semblants that perforates the
consistency of identifications which normally give a stability and unity to
conscious life produces the real of anxiety. In the terms of Lacan's rethink-
ing of object relations theories, the real father who sets himself up as an
obscene law wherejouissance reigns supreme becomes an imaginary figure
of tyranny whose effect on the "object relation" is that of a real privation.'
Examples of such horrors abound in political life, as well as in daily newspa-
pers. In psychoanalytic literature, Judge Daniel Paul Schreber's father is a
famous example. He undertook to be a "real" father of the law and, to that
end, put his son in a torture chamber chair to force him to learn.' The
recent Australian film Shine' depicts the same kind of father. David Helf-
gott's father, determined to make a concert pianist of his son, tortured him
into psychosis (i.e., into foreclosing him as a principle of law).'
The first experience that an infant has of the law is the stabilization and
orientation of the real by a symbol taken from the Other. In that the infant
takes the symbol to be the thing itself, the symbol functions for her as what
Lacan called an S,, or master signifier. This signifier names things from its
position in the symbolic order of thirdness. Indeed, the practice and ritual
of symbolic naming covers over the raw anxiety produced by the real.
1963) (unpublished transcript, on file with author); Jacques Lacan, L'Angoisse, S6minaire du
13 Mars 1963, at 215, 218-19 (Mar. 13, 1963) (unpublished transcript, on file with author).
20. 10 SIGMUND FREUD, Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, in THE STAN-
DARD EDITION, supra note 3, at 5.
21. See id.; cf. Vicente Palomera, The Paternal Function and Little Hans' Phobia, 6
NEWSL. FREUDIAN FIELD 49, 49-61 (1992).
22. See JACQUES LACAN, LE StMINAIRE DE JACQUES LACAN, LvRE IV: LA RELATION
D'OBJET, 1956-1957, at 269 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1994).
23. See Ida Macalpine & Richard A. Hunter, Translators' Introduction to DANIEL PAUL
SCHREBER, MEMOIRS OF MY NERVOUS ILLNESS I, I (Ida Macalpine & Richard A. Hunter eds.
& trans., 1988); Samuel M. Weber, Introduction to the 1988 Edition (Benjamin Gragg trans.)
of DANIEL PAUL SCHREBER, MEMOIRS OF MY NERVOUS ILLNESS vii, vii-ix (Ida Macalpine
& Richard A. Hunter eds. & trans., 1988) (1955); see also 12 SIGMUND FREUD, Psycho-
Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),
in THE STANDARD EDITION, supra note 3, at 9.
24. SHINE (Australian Film Corporation & Film Victoria 1996).
25. See id.
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Lacan emphasized the phenomenon of our naming both experiences and
things. Likewise, we name the effects produced by encounters with the real
of loss or trauma, mourning, melancholia, a kick in the gut, and so on. We
also name the emotions connected with imaginary identifications, such as
jealousy, aggressivity, or narcissistic selfishness. The symbolic comforts by
covering over the real of affect. One could even consider naming it as the
realm that negotiates affect precisely because it offers the safety and comfort
of distance from the real. Moreover, insofar as language represents the
unsaid or unrepresentable, the symbolic seems to be reality. In representing
the affective disturbances of the real whose terms are those of conflict,
tension, and disjunction, the symbolic order functions at one remove from
the real, placing a mask of alienation over this order which Lacan described
as the impossible to bear, the place of non-being.
One can better understand the distinctions Lacan made between his
orders by situating them historically. Such an endeavor also permits us to
acknowledge the degree to which he borrowed from several disciplines in
the elaboration of his teaching. His friendship and intellectual companion-
ship with Lvi-Strauss in the 1950s, for example, enabled him to link the
anthropologist's work to his own. Lvi-Strauss described the founding of
the social - of social symbols - on the interdiction of incest, with its
consequent injunction to marriage exchange, as that which establishes the
conditions necessary for a social ordering of symbols on the basis of this
primary and fundamental taboo.' Incest is the implicit law which founded
law itself.27
Lacan advanced the work on the incest taboo that Freud and L6vi-
Strauss had begun by showing the "empirical" example in reference to which
one can assess what it would mean to be in the structure of incest, in refer-
ence to one who does not fundamentally use language for the purpose of
exchange, or to deny a lack-in-being. The psychotic subject uses language
to try to erect an Other of the Other which would be tolerable. In contrast,
the Other does not deeply trouble the subject who in discourse exchanges
one thing for another without an undue amount of suffering. Indeed, this is
one measure of the presence of law in dialectical thought. It is a knowledge
that psychic oneness with the mother is forbidden. Although a triple
effect - the real father's taboo on incest with the mother, the father as
member of a lawful group, and the mother's desire for the infant to differ
from her in deference to a symbolic father - is required to achieve a norma-
tive structuration of law, Lacan shows only one such effect in his Le
26. See CLAUDE Lvi-STRAuss, STRucruRAL ANTHROPOLOGY 46 (Claire Jacobson &
Brook Grundfest Schoepf trans., 1963).
27. See id. at 47-51.
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s~minaire, livre IV: La relation d'objet, 1956-1957.' He depicts the real
father as producing the beginnings of law or symbolic castration on an infant
by demonstrating that the mother is his sexually and not the infant's. Lacan
does not formulate the logic of the group of masculine subjects who have
undergone symbolic castration until 1972-1973. But, he follows Freud and
Lvi-Strauss who both claimed that the Ur-form of the symbolic law comes
from the Oedipal experience in which the little boy turns away from identifi-
cation with the mother-of-the-drives to identify with the father of language
insofar as language opposes the drives. This turning towards the father
requires him to symbolize the primary father as an Ur-father who is not
castrated. This real father who is (or was) an exception to the symbolic law
of castration remains as a paradoxical principle in that he requires the law
because he is an exception to it. The little girl will identify with symbolic
castration at one remove through her attachment to the phallic signifier.
Within the feminine logic of identification, if she identifies with her mother
as most girls do, then she will have identified with the one who is castrated,
who is not the Other of the Father's Name, and who is proximate to the logic
of the same that characterizes the order of the real.
According to Lacan's sexuation graph,29 if the father confuses having
the mother with being outside the law, then he occupies the place of the
obscene Ur-father that the mythic figure of the primal hoard in Freud's
28. See LACAN, supra note 22, at 269.
29. See Lacan, supra note 2, at 149. Lacan's Sexuation Graph indicates:
3x (Dx -x (Dx
Vx Dx Vx Dx
G
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Totem and Taboo embodied." Insofar as an infant symbolizes the lack that
marks the first knowledge of difference as a difference between the sexes,
one can situate this effect between the symbolic and imaginary. Lacan
denotes the experience with the matheme for a negativized phallus (-4 )
which gradually becomes the lacking subject or the subject of desire ($).
There is a lack-in-being at the point where the subject wants, and this want-
to-be/have is structural. Lacan, moreover, establishes this lack as a negative
effect of law. A cut in identification gives rise to the real loss that catalyzes
the game of moving the imaginary bobbin reel to and fro with accompani-
ment from the phonemic representations of that movement, the Fort! Da!
(Here! Gone!) of Freud's anecdote in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.3"
Charles Pyle writes that mathematico-scientific proof belongs to the
third order, namely the Lacanian symbolic.32 Jean-Paul Gilson writes that
Lacan's topology - the places of psychic structure made up of the relations
of points, lines, surfaces, space and knots - is of the real, with the real
being the time it takes to understand the truth.3 One can locate the void
place precisely between the image of the bobbin reel that Freud's nephew
was rolling back and forth and the real of the infant's loss of his mother from
his field of vision. This loss is not the loss of the mother per se as object
relations theories maintain, however, because the infant subject is not one
with the bobbin reel, or the affect of loss. Rather, Freud's young nephew
is already a subject of desire, the $ who lacks a presence of identity or
fullness to self in the field of language, equated with thought.
This negativity, or lack-in-being, is the referent to which the subject
represents his or her modes of jouissance or enjoyment, divided as it is
among the three intersections of the Borromean knot: (P. As such, one
might call the subject a paradoxical response to loss (0). Although lack-in-
being marks masculine and feminine subjects as subjects of lack and (con-
comitant) desire, Lacan argued in 1972 and 1973 that while masculine
Oedipal identification is with the forms of local universal symbolic and
imaginary law - law being first and foremost the law of the sexual differ-
ence - a feminine resolution of the Oedipal injunction results less in an
identification with symbolic castration than in an identification with the lack
in the Other. If we remember that the first cause of the lack in the Other is
the absence of an essential Woman, it will make sense to say mother is not
an abstract category of the symbolic for woman, as father is for man. The
30. See 13 FREUD, supra note 3, at 125-26; James Strachey, Introduction to 13 THE
STANDARD EDITION, supra note 3, at xi.
31. See 18 FREUD, supra note 9, at 14-15.
32. See Pyle, supra note 8 (manuscript at 9).
33. See JEAN-PAUL GILSON, LA TOPOLOGIE DE LACAN: UNE ARTICULATION DE LA CURE
PSYCHANALYTIQUE 211 (1994).
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imaginary forms connected with motherhood and the signifiers that name the
mother do not sufficiently separate Woman's identification from the real of
the drives and the power of the objects that cause desire to make her a
philosophical or linguistic abstraction. Lacan does not envision the gender
difference here as a binary but as the relation of each sex to the law of
difference, taken as a third thing. Femininity, epistemologically speaking,
is a subject position of identification with the real that transcends the law of
the symbolic.
Lacan's account of the constitution of sexuation places law primarily on
the side of the masculine, which he marks in the overlaps of the Borromeon
unit by two castrations: the positivized one between the real and symbolic
(0) and the negativized one between the symbolic and the imaginary (-4)
where "sense" becomes truth-functional. The feminine in knowledge is
related, then, to the knowledge that something is lacking in the symbolic
itself, a fact that Lacan denoted by placing the bar over the Other (0D). In
recasting the Freudian Oedipus myth as a function of the paternal metaphor
in the 195 0s,' Lacan developed a concept of the phallus which he described
as a function of substitution, specifically the Father's Name substituted for
the Mother's Desire. Although Lacan argued in the 1970s that the Father's
Name was a fiction and not a guarantee of law, he also argued that the
Father's Name was the fourth order of the sinthome through which a person
gives coherence to his life through belief or ideology.
In the 1950s, however, he was concerned with the conceptualization of
the phallus as the value someone or something had as an object of desire.
A child signifies the phallus in the dialectical relation of the mother's uncon-
scious desire to the signifier for the Father's Name. Thus, it is not only the
specific content of a desire in question, but the mother's unconscious itself -
insofar as the unconscious is an interpretation of the sexual difference - that
has the phallus and castration as referents. The phallus (0) is not the Fa-
ther's Name, then, but unconscious messages from the Mother's Desire as
they constitute her infant's symbolic Ideal ego and give the first shape to the
subjectivity of desire and fantasy. Lacan first elaborated his formula in On
a question preliminary to any possible treatment ofpsychosis in reference to
psychosis that does not foreclose oneness with the mother.35
Herein, Lacan suggests that the subjectivity of Schreber's delusion
concerns "[t]he signification of the phallus [which]... must be evoked in
the subject's imaginary by the paternal metaphor."36 A failure to introject
the imaginary father yields psychosis where the only thing signified to the
34. See LAcAN, supra note 4, at 200.
35. See id. at 200-201.
36. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
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subject is the Mother's Desire. Within Lacan's logic, the bedrock structure
of a law of identity adequate to sustain itself is the phallic law, a third term
whose effect calls into being a fourth party. The fourth party is the Father's
Name which functions like dummy at bridge and is found in conjunction with
the theme of death. 7 In this sense, law is the law of the dead Father, a
symbolic function.38 Symbolic functions are ever further removed from the
real of the first experiences of the drives that we can call brute experience.
Some of this brute experience remains resonant within the forms of an
imaginary father whose many faces communicate fear, anger, hope, and so
on. Lacan points out that as agent, the imaginary Father can cause a priva-
tion in the real relation to a supposed object, as far as symbolic value (0) is
concerned. Pyle stresses this paradox: While such forms seem to represent
reality itself, the imaginary is the most duplicitous of all the orders.39
Thus, representation - through both images and language - has the
quality of distance, deferral, and perspective that Pyle describes as "the
symbolic type of proof [that] enjoys great rigor ... [as] a matter of deduc-
tive reasoning from general propositions."40 In Seminar XX, the positivized
phallus refers to a lack in identification that constitutes the sexuated subject
as a masculine or feminine position in knowledge.41 Epistemologically, the
masculine is concerned with differentiations and the mechanisms of the
symbolic, while the feminine in knowledge concerns desire, the masquerade,
loss, and a beyond in knowledge that enters language as an opening onto the
real. Women nonetheless have one foot in the symbolic camp of law and
signifying differences, while men can inscribe themselves on the feminine
side epistemologically.42 By the time Lacan writes the phallus in a positiv-
ized form (0) to mean the effect of the sexual difference as a signifier whose
signifieds are four possible structures of desire, he has given a new twist to
his theory that distinctions made between the masculine and the feminine
organize epistemology. The distinctions come from the particular ways each
subject signifies his or her being in sexuation as a relation to the law of
difference.
In this paradoxical turn, Lacan puts forth the theory that any knowledge
is a knowledge based in desire. Knowledge is based in desire because the
coalescence of the real, imaginary, and symbolic marks language and images
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Charles Pyle, On the Duplicity of Language 55, 91, 93, 271 (Dec. 13, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); cf. LACAN, supra note 22, at 269.
40. See Pyle, supra note 8 (manuscript at 12-13).
41. See LACAN, supra note 1, at 73, 83-85, 89.
42. See Lacan, supra note 2, at 150.
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with three kinds ofjouissance meanings: Jouissance of the void that oscillates
between mania and anxiety; jouissance of the positivized phallus that con-
cerns identification with an Ideal; and jouissance of unconscious identifica-
tions with the imaginary and symbolic traits that make a person the subject
of her own materiality of meanings. Lacan writes the subject of this knowl-
edge regarding desire as a barred S: S.
In the 1960s, Lacan moved from the idea of the phallus as an imaginary
object, created by the mother's desire which gives the baby an ego, to the
notion that the phallus is a signifier - that which represents a subject for
another signifier - that functions dynamically and dialectically to elaborate
desire in structures of the normative masquerade, the neuroses, the psycho-
ses, or perversion. In the 1970s, he moved away from the idea of the
subject as that which a signifier re-presents in reference to another signifier
in order to focus on the ways in which an individual constructs the subject
(of unconscious desire) for sexuation, but in an asymmetrical logic. Basi-
cally, this logic seeks to link the anatomical difference to masculine or
feminine psychic positions. The fact that gender identity does not always
adhere to anatomy is one sign that there is no innate correlation of gender
with sexual identity.
Using the symbols of existential quantors, Lacan proposed that each
subject starts off rooted in sexual identifications and not in the biological
meaning of sex. In A Love Letter, he wrote:
Any speaking being whatever is inscribed on one side or the other. On the
left, on the bottom line, Vx (Dx, indicates that it is through the phallic
function that man takes up his inscription as all, except that this function
finds its limit in the existence of an x through which the function, (Dx, is
negated, 3x 4'-. This is what is called the function of the father from
where is given by negation the proposition 1x, which allows for the
exercise, through castration, of what makes up for the sexual relation -
in so far as the latter can in no way be inscribed. In this case, therefore,
the all rests on the exception posed as the term over that which negates this
Tx totally.43
Now what does Lacan mean by this? He is saying that despite each
person's ability to identify in different ways with the masculine or feminine,
and despite the connections of the two logics to one another as the arrows
depict on his graph, each subject (who is not psychotic) identifies uncon-
sciously as either masculine or feminine. Likewise, each means of identifi-
cation concerns a use of knowledge on the side of the all within the law of
the symbolic or the not all within the law of the symbolic. The hysteric's
discourse is on the side of the question, while the answer is on the side of the
43. Id.
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master. In other words, masculine or feminine positions in knowledge do
not emanate from biology or anatomy. Rather, the infant experiences her
encounter with the social as a trauma, in that she must choose between
masculine and feminine identifications in order to acquire social identity.
Not only does such a demand cut into the mirror-stage illusion of being
whole, it also cuts against the natural grain of mixed identifications that the
infant has already experienced.
Lacan interpreted Freud by arguing that each person's construal of the
sexual difference results in the construction of the lack-in-being around the
repression, denial, repudiation, or foreclosure of this difference. A norma-
tive solution to the traumatic encounter with the sexual difference represses
it, thereafter masquerading around it. A neurotic response denies the
difference, while a perverse solution repudiates it and a psychotic response
forecloses it. One cannot equate these responses to the sexual difference
with masculine or feminine positions in knowledge, however, except to say
that psychosis is always a pousse-a-la-femme. Instead, Lacan's point was
that identification with the masculine works in conscious life on the basis of
a belief in the whole or the all, an epistemological position which totalizes
knowledge. Identification with the feminine, on the other hand, entails an
acceptance of castration that results in a deployment of knowledge as a
knowledge of the part, or the not all.
At the level of simple narrative, Lacan's account of law's foundation in
reference to the phallic signifier and castration offers a logical explanation
of Totem and Taboo. Rather than characterize Freud's venture into pre-
history as the ramblings of late night fatigue or as an innocent excursus into
fantasy, as some commentators have done, Lacan reads this little book as a
structural insight into sexuation that Freud could only explain as a mythical
story. Masculine identification in knowledge is with the One Father, the
one-who-knows, the leader of the group who lays down his or her law to the
group. The fantasy that there is a superman who is an exception to castra-
tion and has it all, gives rise to a masculine solution to paradoxical social co-
existence. Although each individual becomes whole in knowledge, the
masculine response of the all, accepting the first castration - the sexual
difference - is an injunction to submit to the law of the group. It is the
phallic structure.
But where does this logic come from? Lacan argues that the little boy's
first submission to the experience of symbolic castration - his acceptance of
the father as an inhibitor to his oneness with his mother - is an acknowl-
edgment of the real father ofjouissance, the one whom the law permits to
desire the mother. This prohibition of his own incest with the mother
prepares the little boy to believe, at least unconsciously, that there is one
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father who stands outside the law.' Although the little boy represses and
forgets his early interpretation of the Oedipal dilemma, it remains as the
unconscious structural edifice on which he grounds himself in a relation to
law.
Women can inscribe themselves on the masculine side because, accord-
ing to Lacan, nothing prevents it. In any case, they are connected to the
masculine side by the arrows that arise from the lack of an essential Woman.
Lacan reasons that this lack of grounding, attributable to the nonexistence of
the absolute or essential Woman, gives rise to two arrows. These two
arrows suggest paradox: Because there is no pre-given substantive essence
of Woman, the feminine in knowledge intersects - not with the positive
object, but - with the void place in the Other, showing the Other as a
decompleted set rather than the set of the whole that it imagines itself to be
in masculine sexuation. The nonexistence of an essential Woman points to
the void created by her own in-existence, as defined by an essential nature,
and bifurcates in the direction of the phallic or symbolic identifications that
compensate for this lack of foundation. The only arrow that originates on
the masculine side responds to the lack-in-being, and Lacan aims it at the
woman as object a-cause-of-desire.
Given that the masculine entails an identification with an abstraction of
the father as name of the law, it is not surprising that feminine sexuation
works asymmetrically to the masculine. Little girls, like little boys, accept
the symbolic castration that interdicts incest in the name of the Father. They
do not, however, have to rationalize their submission to a same sex parent.
Insofar as the father will always be the opposite sex parent for boys and
girls, there is an internal contradiction within his law. His implicit state-
ment, "You are not the one who can have your mother, I am," constitutes
the first castration of the incest taboo. The second castration is the identifi-
cation of one's self as a double. The little girl, identifying herself with her
mother as the object of the father's desire, believes he also desires her. At
a minimum, this would be the identificatory pattern in the normative Oedipal
trajectory. Lacan symbolizes this by an S(O), stating: "The woman relates
to S(O), which means that she is already doubled, and is not all, since on the
other hand she can also relate to D. "45
On the feminine side, there is no exception to the rule of castration. All
are castrated: ]x (Dx. But paradoxically, all women are not all under the
phallic function, not all under the restrictions of the Father's Law, and all
are not identified with a symbolic injunction to the sexual difference that one
calls patriarchal restrictions. The result of this proximity to the real means
44. See LAcAN, supra note 22, at 269.
45. Lacan, supra note 2, at 152.
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that all women are not all castrated: W CDx. Each one has a freedom, in
relation to symbolic restrictions and conventions, that generally has earned
women labels like seers, mystics, psychic adepts, relationally attuned,
emotionally superior, alongside the inverse face of fear, suspicion, contempt,
envy, and so on.
But what does sexuation have to do with discourse or with love or
desire? In an essay written to Roman Jakobson in response to Jakobson's
communicator/communicatee model of communication, Lacan offered a
reply that joined linguistics to psychoanalysis. Lacan's theory explains the
motivation behind the field of language by suggesting that a master signifier
(S1) or pure signifier takes on its meaning retroactively in reference to a
second signifier, which of necessity was made of the same cloth as the first
signifier. Lacan denotes the second signifier as the one required to establish
a body of knowledge (S2). He developed these two signifiers in On
Jakobsone' and refers to them in the beginning of A Love Letter.' Lacan
hoped his sexuation graphs would convey to his interlocutors that the S2"goes further than being merely secondary in relation to the pure signifier
which is inscribed as S,."' In so doing, he implies that the symbolic and
real of sexuation are inferred in between the gaps of words and sounds in
reference (8) to the phallic signifier with which one identifies as a reality
principle ((D); by the desire that hides fantasy within discursive language in
one's identification with or to the object a-cause-of-desire; and in one's
experience of the void in the Other (S[O]). Both epistemologies - the
masculine and the feminine - are grounded in the absence of an essential
Woman that one experiences in knowledge as a pure castration. Elsewhere,
Lacan calls this S2.
Lacan's discourse theory, first elaborated in Le Sdminaire, Livre XVII
L'envers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970,49 then summarized in Encore,5 °
suggests the same idea that he develops later in the sexuation chapter. If one
tries to decipher meaning directly from language itself, one will miss its most
important components, its "sense" orjouis-sens, which quickly turns mean-
ing into semblance." Regarding Jakobson, he says:
46. See Lacan, supra note 7, at 152 (English version); LACAN, supra note 1, at 19
(French version).
47. See Lacan, supra note 2, at 149-50.
48. Id. at 149.
49. See JACQUES LAcAN, LE SgMINAIRE OF JACQUES LACAN, LIVRE XVII: L'NVERS
DE LA PSYCHOANALISE, 1969-1970, at 176-77 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1991).
50. See LACAN, supra note 1, at 19-27.
51. See Lacan, supra note 2, at 150.
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One day, I realized that it was difficult not to get involved in linguistics
from the moment the unconscious was discovered. Whereupon, I did
something which to tell the truth seems to me the only objection I can
formulate to what you may have heard the other day from Jakobson,
specifically that everything that has to do with language is dependent on
linguistics - that is, in the final analysis, on the linguist. Not that I do not
willingly grant him this concerning poetry, in regard to which he has
advanced this argument. But if one considers all that follows from the
definition of language as far as the foundation of the subject is con-
cerned - which has been both renewed and subverted by Freud to the
degree that for him it affirms everything that he asserts about the uncon-
scious - it then becomes necessary, in order to leave Jakobson his private
domain, to coin some other word, which I will call linguisterie .... My
statement that the unconscious is structured like a language does not belong
to the field of linguistics. It is an open door ... on that sentence which
I wrote on the board on several occasions last year without developing it
any further: "what one may really be saying is left hidden behind what is
said in what can be heard." 52
Feminist philosopher Nancy Fraser, like some other feminist commenta-
tors on Lacan, has not taken the measure of Lacan's rejection of the structur-
alist linguistic model, the Saussurean model, which he radically reconcep-
tualized. Likewise, she has not addressed the importance of his theories of
the masculine and feminine as knowledge positions. Fraser's errors are
typical of many readings of Lacan that conflate his use of structural linguis-
tics with an imaginary concept of him as a structuralist linguist. Fraser
argues that one should shun Lacanianism because it "abstracts from
parole ...bracket[ing] questions of practice, agency, and the speaking
subject[, and] [t]hus, it does not engage with the discursive practices through
which social identities and social groups are formed. ,
53
Perhaps an understanding of Lacan's discourse theory will begin to
address the doubts Fraser expresses about Lacan's usefulness for feminist
theory, social practice, or politics. Lacan's reply to Jakobson expands upon
his early depiction in the Schema L of how a quadrature of four terms
constitutes the agency of the subject. When the subject makes a social link,
it brings into language: (1) a master signifier (Si) that one might equate with
the unconscious formation of an Ideal ego, (2) a second signifier (S2) that
imposes jouissance knowledge (connaissance) on what we ordinarily call
knowledge (or savoir), (3) an object-cause-of-desire (a) at the location where
jouissance points to a surplus value in language, and (4) the subject of the
52. Lacan, supra note 7, at 152-53 (citations omitted) (English version); LACAN, supra
note 1, at 19-20 (French version).
53. FRASER, supra note 13, at 155.
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unconscious that places a lack in conscious language. Any act of speech that
engages the other qua other uses these elements within four possible different
kinds of discourse (master, university, hysteric and analyst). From the
moment the unconscious enters language as a functional presence in lan-
guage, albeit a presence aimed askew of conventional meanings of a sup-
posed common tongue, discursive practices must take account of the possi-
bility that language does not work from a linguistic categorical imperative,
nor is the subject agent unified, nor is there ever a unity of the "we" except
in epiphanic moments of identification with an Ideal. Lacan brings us to the
recognition that no one will advance in understanding how discourse works
by supposing that there is no structure to it and no limits.
The distinction that Lacan makes between the use of grammatical
language, whether spoken or written, and his theory of discourse is entirely
and radically new. Keeping Saussure's distinction between speech (la
parole) - the speakers' uses of language in communication or the practice
of speech along with its symbolic system or code - and written language (la
langue), Lacan nonetheless does away with Saussure's devaluation ofparole
at the expense of langue.' Lacan teaches that one can be in language with-
out being in discourse. For example, psychotic subjects are in language, but
not in discourse. Adding to Saussure's theory, Lacan develops the idea that
parole comes from langue, but that parole reveals the properties of desire
andjouissance that written language can hide. Thus, parole connects both
spoken and written language, but more particularly the spoken, to the gaze,
the voice, the phoneme, and the other objects-cause-of-desire that bring
something of the real into language itself. In one sense, the truths of sexual-
ity, trauma, and anxiety that Lacan later equated with the real can never be
directly revealed except in speech.
More surprisingly still, Lacan added love as one of the salient character-
istics of discourse that he defines, basically, as the social or exchange.
However, in Lacan's theory, it is not love per se that constitutes discourse
in the sense of various kinds of feelings in friendship, family, or romance.
Rather, love is the very sign within language that expresses one's acknowl-
edgment of the other person as particular. Still borrowing from linguistics,
Lacan uses Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of the sign - that which com-
municates something to someone - to say that "love is the sign that one
changes discourse.""
54. See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTIcs 24-25, 138-39
(Charles Bally et al. eds., Wade Baskins trans., 1959); cf. RAGLAND-SULLIVAN, supra note
9, at 208-09.
55. Lacan, supra note 7, at 153 (emphasis added) (English version); LAcAN, supra note
1, at 21 (French version).
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Lacan argues that language is not discourse. In comparison, linguist
Charles Pyle contends that language is confused and confusing. Indeed,
language is duplicitous. Pyle's point, which Lacan does not make, is that
language is not essentially a function of physics or biology, but of truth. The
relation between language and truth is, at the most basic level, a simple and
straightforward one. Language is an inverse function of truth. 6 Lacan
included truth as one of the four topological places in his theory of four
discourse structures - master, university, hysteric and analyst - that make
a social link. Each discourse has a different agent of truth occupying the
place in the lower left comer of the structure. In the master discourse, for
example, the (repression of the) lack-in-being - which is commensurable
with the sexual masquerade that marks the sexuation of normative desire -
fills that place. In other words, any language functioning as discourse is
double because it maintains two terms in consciousness and two in the
unconscious at the same time. The topological places in which the four
terms - S1, S2, a, and $ - rotate are the speaking agent, the other who
receives the message, truth, and the production of meaning.57
Each type of discourse - master, university, hysteric, and analyst -
takes its descriptive name not only from its label, then, but also in reference
to the discourse that precedes it. The master discourse tries to achieve the
impossible, namely to impose the speaker's master signifiers or major
identity themes on the other. The speaker confuses his or her knowledge
with the making of truth; but the master discourse is a use of language for
sheer power politics. It has nothing to do with truth. Although Lacan states
that one can infer a logic in the breaking down of language towards the truth
from the master discourse through the university and hysteric's discourse to
the analyst's discourse, he also says that something of the analytic discourse
will emerge in the passage from one discourse structure to another.5 8
In light of Lacan's theory of discourse, one is always listening to
language backwards, in that a listener is trying to know the truth hiding
behind what is being said. The progression towards the analytic discourse
is probably not all that different from the progression towards the truth that
law seeks, at least ideally. It seems quite clear that the legal discourse, from
its myriad angles, takes apart the master discourse, as characterized by its
multiform efforts to tally reality and truth to the language conventions of an
historical moment. Moreover, the master discourse, like the masculine
position in sexuation, totals at the expense of imputing any truth value to the
56. See Pyle, supra note 39, at 7.
57. See Lacan, supra note 7, at 153 (English version); LACAN, supra note 1, at 20
(French version).
58. See Lacan, supra note 7, at 153 (English version); LACAN, supra note 1, at 20
(French version).
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fantasy base (S < > a) underlying every use of language. For purposes of
discussion, Lacan's theory of this base is similar to what contemporary
American intellectuals call subjectivity. The master discourse denies any
lack-in-being, it denies the substratum of desire in language, and it denies
that there are purposes and teleology to words that go beyond the significa-
tions of grammar, syntax, and semantics. Whether used in any institutional
discourse, everyday speech, or literary criticism, the master discourse also
denies that terms such as desire or surplus value in language, much less
unconscious formations, actually condition the language of conscious percep-
tion. Thus, Lacan labels the effort made between the agent of speech and
the other as impossible.
Lacan argues that one's own cause in desire, the a cause that places the
quest for herjouissance as the carrot to the donkey of a structural lack-in-
being, rather than any essential commitment to truth or altruism, supports the
position of the other in the master discourse. Moreover, this enjoyment has
a lethal inverse side that Lacan refers to as an "excess in enjoying." This
means that not only does the fetishization of some beyond appear in mean-
ing, but the point where a subject appears as subject to its own limits -
which Lacan formalized in the terms of repetition, desire, and fantasy -
does as well. In Lacan's terms, this point of excess is not a place of infinite
and pleasurable freeplay, limited by nothing.
In his caption under the master discourse, Lacan asserts that regression
from the university discourse clarifies the master discourse. This gives
further support to his claim that we can understand these structures by
reading them backwards, starting with the analytic discourse:
I will now remind you of the four modes of discourse which I have differ-
entiated. There exist four on the sole basis of this psychoanalytical dis-
course ....
... [olne must listen for a testing of this truth, that analytical dis-
course appears at every transition from one discourse to another. That is
all I am saying when I say that love is the sign that one is changing one's
discourse.59
The obsessional discourse, which various Lacanian scholars have
theorized as containing the same structure as the university discourse, places
a body of knowledge (S2) in the position of agent of speech and aims its
message at the other as the quintessential subject of rhetoric - the one whom
strategies, rather than truth, must seduce. At the very least, Lacan's point
is that the academic discourse is not a matter of flat or rote learning where
the teacher pours the contained - her knowledge - into the waiting con-
59. Lacan, supra note 7, at 153 (English version); LACAN, supra note 1, at 20 (French
version).
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tainer of an empty student vessel. Insofar as it has the aim of seducing the
student with the teacher's knowledge, an enterprise which, according to
Lacan, the progress from this discourse to the next one - the hysteric's -
clarifies, the university discourse makes a progression towards truth that the
master discourse does not make. The impotence in the university discourse
structure lies in its use of a concept of the learning "we" that leads the
teacher to ignore the desire (to learn) that arises from each student in the
particular (8). By extending Lacan's terms, one can see that this discourse
structure is typical of any institutional discourse that uses an organized
knowledge or set of rules and strategies as the other's truth, such as medical,
legal, or theological discourse. Still, in taking the student's desire as its point
of aim, the academic discourse is not a master discourse. It is not a master
discourse that also ignores the fact that the other's knowledge has already
been structured in minute detail, within concrete signifying units oriented in
terms of the singularities and particularities of desire, fantasy, and drive.
The "progress" made in the hysteric's discourse clarifies the university
discourse. This "progress" occurs when the lack-in-being - concomitant
with the unconscious subject of desire - acts as agent of speech, aiming
towards the other's master signifier in an attempt not to convince, but to
anchor his or her lack-in-being in terms of another's law. Lacan marks this
discourse's impotence with the arrow that points to the hysteric's knowledge
of the object a at the place of truth.' The hysteric's discourse contains the
paradox that she seeks a balance to her lack-in-being in the other's certainty,
while knowing this truth: Meaning is governed by the cause of desire.
The final of these four discourse structures is the analyst's discourse in
which the patient's suspended cause of desire holds the position of agent; a
symptom announces an impasse in enjoyment. The analyst-sits in as silent
witness to dumb repetitions which constitute the condition of the human sub-
ject - in analysis or not - that Charles Pyle has called suffering. Man is,
Pyle says, homo pathos. Indeed, Lacan knew this and his entire teaching
was an investigation of how each speaking subject, one by one, could deliver
the truth in such a way as to alleviate suffering. Lacan argued throughout
his teaching that the real of suffering requires that each subject work with his
or her desire to be and against the signifiers that have already fixated them
in being. Lacan argued that we suffer from language and identifications that
function as actual thorns in our flesh. For individuals and for social change,
the hopeful part is that they can pull out the thorns because the images,
words, and affective responses that come to constitute each person as a
subject of the Other put them in concretely in the first place. "Mind" or
60. See supra note 29 (providing Lacan's Sexuation Graph).
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thought is not only language, it is language that the associative relations of
the Borromean unit organize. The Borromean unit is real, symbolic, and
imaginary material that the sinthome knotted in keeping with the early
response that each gave to the Oedipal law which shaped him or her as
essentially a subject of desire, rather than a subject of reason. The sinthome
or knot constitutes each subject as a subject of desire.
The sign that marks a distinction between using language as discourse -
for the purpose of social exchange - and using it as flat information, lies in
the appearance of love in thefield of language at the point where language
changes from one discourse to another. Rather than remarking on love as
an affect or a convention, Lacan's emphasis is on "the question of love
[as] ... linked to the one about knowledge."61 Love is the sign of a limit
that marks the difference between one discourse and its preceding discourse.
A simple, concrete example may help to explain the meaning of this hypoth-
esis. If your grocer says to you, "Don't touch the tomatoes!," he has spoken
a master discourse to you. He has sent a message to you in the superego
terms of an impermeable meaning, one which commands. If the grocer
notices your chagrin, takes pity on you, and includes you as other in his
purview by saying something like: "It's not easy, you know, to grow toma-
toes that people will want to buy. They look so hearty, but actually they are
quite delicate. You have to hope for a great deal of sunlight and a sufficient
amount of rain and then choose the right place and the right insecticides and
fertilizers so that the bugs won't eat the vines, etc.," to you, then the grocer
has switched from using language as a master discourse to using it as a
university discourse. The lesson she gives on "how to grow tomatoes" is not
really the point because it has another meaning which does not really con-
cern vegetables. The lesson concerns love. The hearer, the buyer of vegeta-
bles, the receiver of the message, has understood that the grocer has
proffered an act of love in speech. The grocer is conveying a message; quite
simply, the grocer has moved in her message from the tyrannical, moral
position of superego, ferocity, and negativity, replete with the inducement
of shame and guilt in the other. She has seen the buyer. The explanation of
how hard it is to grow nice tomatoes that will sell adds the dimension of
love.
Both the master and university discourses are redolent of superiority,
but, at the point of change from one to the other, an act of love has occurred
in the taking of the other into account. The grocer may even continue,
changing to yet another discourse structure by asking the customer what kind
of vegetables she grows or whether she likes to grow vegetables at all. Such
61. See LACAN, supra note 1, at 84 (author's translation from French to English).
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a use of language brings love in the form of truly taking account of the other.
Lacan calls this the structure of the hysteric where the lack-in-being (i.e., the
question) functions as the agent of speech. If the grocer then urges the
customer to free-associate about what she wants out of life, he has infringed
his role as grocer and taken up the position of the analyst.
We can see that the master discourse identifies itself with the language
of social convention of the positivized phallus (S1 -> S/2A), and with the
masculine position in Lacan's sexuation table, residing where the language
spoken gives a local universal law of what it is licit to say. The master takes
his or her language as reality, which is why Lacan writes "impossible" over
the connection between the SI and S2 in the discourse structure. 62 When the
master discourse serves as the language of the Other to convey to the other
the masquerade required, one is very far away from truth. Furthermore,
Lacan links love to truth in his theory that the master discourse is based on
lying and duplicity, while the analytic discourse allows one to speak the
truth.
To validate his own theory, Lacan takes recourse to theological scholar-
ship. That is, if something has the value of a (near) universal logic, then
someone will have theorized it before. In this, Lacan supplies a new way to
read history. However different the content - the historical conventions and
expressions - may be, the structural logic will remain intact. In the logic
that Port-Royal theologians advanced, for example, Lacan claims the dis-
junction of two substances which would have no common part - what
modem-day symbolic logic has designated as the logic of intersection
((]D)63 - defines love. The point of the Port-Royal theologians was this:
What is not a sign of love is the jouissance of the Other and the body that
symbolizes it. Sexualjouissance is not a sign of love, Lacan claims. A sign
of love is the changing of discourse. The agent of discourse aims a message
at the other. This produces a meaning concerning one's recognition of the
other that one can take as truth.
While the master discourse is a discourse of repression and duplicity -
a semblance according to Lacan - with an unconscious intention to hide the
truth that desire, fantasy, or emotion have any meaningful function within
language, the negation implicit in such denial is itself functional truth? 4 In
that the Lacanian subject is the subject of unconscious desire whose language
62. See Lacan, supra note 7, at 153.
63. See LACAN, supra note 15, at 211-12.
64. See Jean Hyppolite, A Spoken Commentary on Freud's Verneinung, in THE SEMINAR
OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK I: FREUD'S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE, 1953-1954, at 289-97
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., John Forrester trans., 1988); cf. 19 SIGMUND FREUD, Negation,
in THE STANDARD EDrION, supra note 3, at 233, 235-39.
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is that of the fantasy that drives language to seek something other than what
it says it seeks (che vuoi), the lack-in-being governs language at the point
where enjoyment turns into repetitive displeasure. At a primary level, these
are recognizable limits that exist within grammatical language. At a second
level of function, they are the precise terms of the discourse one is using.
However, they are never natural or biological responses to events or objects.
Although Lacan shows how one formally structures these terms as
meaning - the meaning ofjouissance being as localizable and recognizable
as are the meanings of representation - this system of meaning is not a
familiar referent of Anglo-American pragmatic thought. Anglo-American
thought finds its bases in the method of empirical science, symbolic logic,
and analytic philosophy that refer themselves to the authority of physics as
the standard on which science is based.'
Lacan's table of sexuation depicts the logical results of taking on knowl-
edge as sexuated - as masculine or feminine epistemological positions -
thereby advancing a reason as to why discourse is duplicitous. Lacan
proposes that these are the only possible responses to the constitution of
identity as sexuated. He does not place psychosis on the graph because,
there, the sexual division does not obtain. Nonetheless, the graph supposes
the psychoses as the empirical referent of the case that offers the exception
to the rule on which the rule is based, given that psychosis is the foreclosure
of the sexual difference.
Language duplicitously uses most people, however, because the experi-
ences of separation and alienation constitute their subject being. Separation,
as Lacan uses it, concerns the paradoxical dialectic of the loss of the Ur-
objects that first cause desire and the recuperation of traces of the lost
objects which build up into a subjective Ur-lining of the real with objects
first introjected from the Other. This dialectical movement constitutes the
first cut - which becomes the first castration in Lacanian topology - whose
logic Charles Sanders Peirce developed in his theory that markedness oper-
ates as a firstness, secondness, and thirdness of cuts in language.6 The first
cut involves the loss of the first object(s)-cause-of-desire whose primordial
forms are fantasy delineations of the organ/objects of the breast, the voice,
the gaze, and the feces (the urinary flow, the phoneme, the imaginary phal-
lus, the nothing).67 These primordial objects serve, henceforth, as the
referent of desire in its quest to satiate its own inverse, namely the lack-in-
being created by encounters with loss. This initial experience of the world
65. See Pyle, supra note 39, at xiii.
66. See Pyle, supra note 17, §§ 4.1, 4.2.
67. See JACQUES LACAN, Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the
Freudian Unconscious, in ]CRITS: A SELECTION, supra note 4, at 292, 315.
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overdetermines all subsequent meaning-making on the axis of an effort to
eradicate loss.
Pyle claims the cut is not only the logical operation by which something
is taken as a sign, but also is the basic predicate of Peirce's diagrammatic
logic. 68 Pyle states:
The logic of the cut assumes that a thing is a thing first, having its own
intrinsic nature. And a thing only becomes a sign secondarily as a result
of being taken as such by some third party, an observer.... The cut that
generates the sign, also generates the duplicitous situation in which the
sign has its being qua sign. And thus the cut positions the thing as alien-
ated from itself in the secondary derivative universe of discourse where it
plays the role of sign. In taking the thing as a sign, one is taking it, not
as the thing itself, but in the role of representative of something else.
69
In the paradoxical logic of duplicity, the cut functions to engender all signs
as duplicitous.70
In Lacan's recasting of symbolic logic, the experience of alienation,
which entails identification with the images and language of society, occurs
at the same time as separation, making deferral and duplicity properties of
language itself. Separation and alienation, two primordial experiences of the
sense of the world, place repression and denial at the center of language.
Although Lacan's master discourse structure is based on denial and repres-
sion of any truth function of language other than identifying the words used
with positive facts or empirical realities, this discourse does take the other
qua subject into account. In this sense, it is still in the social. By addressing
a signifier to another as a knowledge for that person to receive, a master
discourse, even if spoken in an imperative mode, has the potential for doubt.
If you tell the other something, you have acknowledged her Otherness and
have shown that the subject is a divided structure. If one truly lacks uncer-
tainty, one need not speak to the other at all. If psychotic subjects speak to
an other qua other, it is not to deliver a body of knowledge based on the
paradoxical co-existence of certainty (Si) that a lack-in-being (8) - which
Baas and Zaloszyc call the doubt on which subjectivity is based -
subtends.71 The master speaks to ensure that the other verify and validate his
or her fantasy of identity. There is an implicit duality in such language.
68. See Pyle, supra note 8 (manuscript at 16).
69. Id.
70. See id. (manuscript at 16-17).
71. See BERNARD BAAS & ARMAND ZALOSZYC, DESCARTES ET LES FONDEMENTS DE
LA PSYCHANALYSE 23 (1988).
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Taking up, once more, the example of the grocer who commands the
customer in imperative terms not to touch the tomatoes, one is caught up in
the use of language as a master discourse. Property rights or semiotic
conventions of a culture are not the point here. The master discourse
believes that what it says is true, whether tomatoes or some other object or
concept is at issue. His or her iitention is to convey the content of a mes-
sage to the other as a knowledge that, defacto, excludes enjoyment or affect
from the field of meaning, except the enjoyment taken from enforcing his or
her will. The master discourse denies the unconscious dimension which
subtends in conscious language. Thus, the structure of fantasy - S < >a -
is the excluded term in the master discourse. In the university discourse, the
unconscious terms are those of the listener's lack-in-being signifier and the
speaker's master signifier. In the hysteric's discourse, the excluded terms
are knowledge and her awareness that knowledge revolves around the object-
cause-of-desire. The supporting unconscious terms in the analyst's discourse
are the analysand's master signifer (or phallic identification with a Father's
Name) and the analyst's knowledge that supports the use she makes of
language in analysis.
In conclusion, one can say that based on "Lacan's theory of language,"
language itself is the law of the symbolic universe.2 What Lacan adds to
symbolic logic and linguistics - to change their terms - is an understanding
of what constitutes the orders of firstness (the imaginary) and secondness (the
real) in the construction of law in reference to a third term that he labels
sexuation. Finally, the dynamics of sexuation operate in language to show
that knowledge is not itself. Nor is language the whole of its field, if one
accepts that a subject's response to the phallic signifier (S1, S) in its relation
to desire (8) and enjoyment (a) develops the social link Lacan defines as
discourse.
72. See Pyle, supra note 8 (manuscript at 79).
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*Lacan, supra note 7, at 153.
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